We examine the development of open macroeconomic policy choices among developing economies from the perspective of the powerful -trilemma‖ hypothesis. Using the -trilemma indexes‖ (Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito, 2010) that measure the extent of achievement in monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial openness, we observe that the three dimensions of the trilemma configurations are converging towards a -middle ground‖ among emerging market economies with managed exchange rate flexibility, underpinned by sizable holdings of international reserves, and intermediate levels of monetary independence and financial integration. We also find emerging market economies with more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two decades. Emerging markets with low levels of international reserves holding could experience higher levels of output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy divergence while it does not apply to economies with high levels of international reserves holding. These results indicate that holding a high volume of international reserves may give room to emerging market economies to choose a policy combination from a wider spectrum of policy combinations.
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Introduction
Ever since the breakout of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, policy makers have gathered and discussed the future of the international monetary system. Policy makers from many countries have questioned the current international monetary system that has been essentially a uni-currency system heavily dependent on the U.S. dollar, the currency of the epicenter of the crisis, as the international reserve currency. China, with its mighty economy that has been growing at an impressive rate in the last two decades, has been one of the biggest challengers to the current international financial framework. However, while it challenges the dollar-dominant system and criticizes the U.S. profligacy for being responsible for the crisis, China itself is the largest holder of dollar reserves. It holds more than $3 trillion of foreign reserves, more than 30% of the world's foreign reserves, with more than two-thirds denominated in the U.S. dollar.
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 has been followed by the Euro debt crisis, damaging the credibility of the Euro as the second largest international reserve currency and, consequently, leaving the U.S. dollar as the sole safe haven currency. Despite the feeble recovery of the U.S. economy, and given no other alternative international currency that can replace the role of the dollar or the Euro, international investors choose the U.S. dollar as the sole safe haven currency only after the process of elimination. That means, the U.S. still maintains the -exorbitant privilege‖ even though it is its profligacy partially financed by capital inflow that started the chain of crises. In such an international monetary system, frustration has amounted among high-growth developing countries, such as the BRIC countries -Brazil, Russia, India, and China -that are increasing their presence in the world economy. While the global financial crisis of 2008-09 barely left a dent on these economies' economic growth, the U.S. attempts to provide ample liquidity through extremely loose monetary policy have caused influx of capital to these high-growth economies, sowing seeds for asset inflation, especially in emerging market economies with de facto exchange rate fixity to the dollar.
With the low yield and expected depreciation trend of dollar-denominated assets, the opportunity cost of holding dollar assets has been increasing rapidly among the countries that hold massive international reserves (Jeanne, 2011) while they cannot find alternative international reserve currencies that can provide the same level of safe haven and liquidity to the extent of the U.S. dollar. Some developing economies, most notably China, hold so large an 2 amount of dollar assets that any attempt of selling off dollar assets could exacerbate the depreciation trend, increasing capital losses.
In sum, the international monetary system is facing the Triffin dilemma again. As countries created the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a solution to the dilemma in the 1960s, powerful developing countries are now seeking for a drastic reform in the SDR as well as the international monetary system. However, a rise in the relative economic power has not been matched by a proportional rise in the status of these economies' currencies. One main reason for that it is only for the last two decades when middle-income developing countries have been actively opening their financial markets. Slow and cautious process for financial liberalization is due to its double-edged sword nature; while it can supplement domestic financial intermediation, financial opening can make countries exposed to economic and financial turmoil.
However, moving toward further financial globalization seems to be an irreversible trend for developing countries. At least, that is how policy makers in those economies perceive financial liberalization even including those in financially closed economies such as China. Now the question is, how to proceed with financial liberalization, especially in a way that would not put the country in a turbulence. Such a task can be complex in such a globalized environment.
Despite the complexity of policy management, policy makers face a simple, old theoretical constraint, called the -impossible trinity,‖ or -trilemma.‖ This is a hypothesis that was first made popular by Mundell (1963) . The hypothesis states that a country simultaneously may choose any two, but not all, of the three goals of monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration to the full extent. This hypothesis has been widely taught and recognized since it is quite intuitive and helpful to understand the constraints policy makers must face in an open economy setting.
Despite its pervasive recognition, the hypothesis has not faced much empirical scrutiny until recently. The main reason for that is because it is quite difficult to create systematic metrics that measure the extent of achievement in the three policy goals of the trilemma. If one does not know to what extent each of the policy choices has been achieved, it is difficult to estimate what kind of other policy choices are still available and to what extent. Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2010) developed a set of the -trilemma indexes‖ that measure the degree to achievement in each of the three policy choices for a wide coverage of countries 3 and years. Using the indexes, they empirically proved that the hypothesis is valid by showing that the three measures of the trilemma are linearly related to each other.
In this paper we will characterize the policy choices developing economies have adopted over years from the perspective of the powerful hypothesis of the trilemma. For this attempt, we will use the -trilemma indexes‖ of Aizenman, et al. (2010) , empirically proving that the hypothesis is -binding‖ -the three policies are linearly related with each other so that policy makers must face a trade-off in choosing a combination of two out of the three open macro policies. Lastly, we will focus on a characteristic of emerging market economies that have been evident in recent decades. That is the tendency for the -middle-ground convergence‖ -emerging market economies tend to choose a policy combination composed of intermediate levels of all three policies. We provide some evidence that a country equipped with intermediate levels of the three trilemma policies tend to experience a lower level of output volatility. That may explain the recent tendency of middle-ground convergence among emerging market economies.
The Trilemma Theory and Evidence
The Trilemma Hypothesis
The trilemma is illustrated in Figure 1 . Each of the three sides of the trianglerepresenting monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and financial integration-depicts a potentially desirable goal, yet it is not possible to be simultaneously on all three sides of the triangle. For example, the top vertex, labeled -floating exchange rate,‖ is associated with the full extent of monetary policy autonomy and financial openness, but not exchange rate stability.
History has shown that different international financial systems have attempted to achieve combinations of two out of the three policy goals, such as the Gold Standard systemguaranteeing capital mobility and exchange rate stability -and the Bretton Woods systemproviding monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability. The fact that economies have altered the combinations as a reaction to crises or major economic events may be taken to imply that each of the three policy options is a mixed bag of both merits and demerits for managing macroeconomic conditions.
Greater monetary independence could allow policy makers to stabilize the economy through monetary policy without being subject to other economies' macroeconomic management, thus potentially leading to stable and sustainable economic growth. However, in a world with 4 price and wage rigidities, policy makers could also manipulate output movement (at least in the short-run), thus leading to increasing output and inflation volatility. Furthermore, monetary authorities could also abuse their autonomy to monetize fiscal debt, and therefore end up destabilizing the economy through high and volatile inflation.
Exchange rate stability could bring out price stability by providing an anchor, and lower risk premium by mitigating uncertainty, thereby fostering investment and international trade.
Also, at the time of an economic crisis, maintaining a pegged exchange rate could increase the credibility of policy makers and thereby contribute to stabilizing output movement (Aizenman and Glick, 2009 ). However, greater levels of exchange rate stability could also rid policy makers of a policy choice of using exchange rate as a tool to absorb external shocks.
1 Hence, the rigidity caused by exchange rate stability could not only enhance output volatility, but also cause misallocation of resources and unbalanced, unsustainable growth.
Financial liberalization is perhaps the most contentious and hotly debated policy among the three policy choices of the trilemma. On the one hand, more open financial markets could lead to economic growth by paving the way for more efficient resource allocation, mitigating information asymmetry, enhancing and/or supplementing domestic savings, and helping transfer of technological or managerial know-how (i.e., growth in total factor productivity). 2 Also, economies with greater access to international capital markets should be better able to stabilize themselves through risk sharing and portfolio diversification. On the other hand, it is also true that financial liberalization has often been blamed for economic instability, especially over the last two decades, including the current crisis. Based on this view, financial openness could expose economies to volatile cross-border capital flows resulting in sudden stops or reversal of capital flows, thereby making economies vulnerable to boom-bust cycles (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002) .
Thus, theory tells us that each one of the three trilemma policy choices can be a doubleedged sword, which should explain the wide and mixed variety of empirical findings on each of 1 Prasad (2008) argues that exchange rate rigidities would prevent policy makers from implementing appropriate policies consistent with macroeconomic reality, implying that they would be prone to cause asset boom and bust by overheating the economy. 2 Henry (2006) argues that only when it fundamentally changes productivity growth through financial market development, could equity market liberalization policies have a long-term effect on investment and output growth. Otherwise, the effect of financial liberalization should be short-lived, which may explain the weak evidence on the link between financial liberalization and growth.
5 the three policy choices. 3 Furthermore, to make the matter more complicated, while there are three ways of pairing two out of the three policies (i.e., three vertices in the triangle in Figure 1 ), 
Development of Policy Combinations in the Trilemma Context
Despite its pervasive recognition, there has been almost no empirical work that we are groups. For the industrialized economies, financial openness accelerated after the beginning of 3 As for monetary independence, refer to Obstfeld, et al. (2005) and Frankel et al. (2004) . On the impact of the exchange rate regime, refer to Ghosh et al. (1997) , Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) , and Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) . The empirical literature on the effect of financial liberalization is surveyed by Edison et al. (2002) , Henry (2006) , Kose et al. (2006) , Prasad et al. (2003) , and Prasad and Rajan (2008) . 4 Notable exceptions include works by Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor (2005 Developing economies on the other hand do not present such a distinct divergence of the indexes, and their experiences differ depending on whether they are emerging or non-emerging market economies. 7 For emerging market economies, exchange rate stability declined rapidly from the 1970s through the mid-1980s. After some retrenchment around early 1980s (in the wake of the debt crisis), financial openness started rising from 1990 onwards. For the other developing economies, exchange rate stability declined less rapidly, and financial openness trended upward more slowly. In both cases though, monetary independence remained more or less trendless.
Interestingly, for the emerging market economies, the indexes suggest a convergence toward the middle ground, even as talk of the disappearing middle has been doing the rounds.
This pattern of results suggests that developing economies may have been trying to cling to moderate levels of both monetary independence and financial openness while maintaining higher levels of exchange rate stability. In other words, they have been leaning somewhat against the trilemma over a period that interestingly coincides with the time when some of these economies began accumulating sizable international reserves (IR), potentially to buffer the trade-off arising from the trilemma.
None of these observations is applicable to non-emerging developing market economies ( Figure 2 [c]). For this group of economies, exchange rate stability has been the most aggressively pursued policy throughout the period. In contrast to the experience of the emerging market economies, financial liberalization has not been proceeding rapidly for the non-emerging market developing economies. 
Linear Relationships of the Trilemma Indexes
While the preceding analyses are quite useful for tracing out the evolution of international macroeconomic policy orientation, we have not demonstrated whether these three macroeconomic policy goals are -binding‖ in the sense of the impossible trinity. That is, it is important for us to provide evidence that countries have faced the trade-offs based on the trilemma. A challenge facing a full test of the trilemma tradeoff is that the trilemma framework does not impose any obvious functional form on the nature of the tradeoffs between the three trilemma variables. To illustrate this concern, we must note that the instrument scarcity association with the trilemma implies that increasing one trilemma variable, say higher financial integration, should induce lower exchange rate stability, or lower monetary independence, or a combination of these two policy adjustments. 9 Hence, we test the validity of the simplest possible trilemma specification -a linear tradeoff. Specifically, we test whether the weighted sum of the three trilemma policy variables equals a constant. This reduces to examining the goodness of fit of this linear regression:
where j can be either IDC, ERM, or LDC. (1) Because we have shown that different subsample groups of countries have experienced different development paths, we allow the coefficients on all the variables to vary across different groups of countries -industrialized countries, the countries that have been in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and developing countries -by allowing for interactions between the explanatory variables and the dummies for these subsamples. 10 The regression is run for the full sample period as well as the subsample periods that are divided by major economic event and crises, i.e., the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, and the Asian crisis of 1997-98. The results are reported in Table 1 .
The rationale behind this exercise is that policy makers of an economy must choose a weighted average of the three policies in order to achieve a best combination of the two. Hence, if we can find the goodness of fit for the above regression model is high, it would suggest a linear specification is rich enough to explain the trade off among the three policy dimensions. In other words, the lower the goodness of fit, the weaker the support for the existence of the tradeoff, suggesting either that the theory of the trilemma is wrong, or that the relationship is nonlinear.
Secondly, the estimated coefficients in the above regression model should give us some approximate estimates of the weights countries put on the three policy goals. However, the estimated coefficients alone will not provide sufficient information about -how much of‖ the policy choice countries have actually implemented. Hence, looking into the predictions using the (orange line with -x‖).
From these panels of figures, we can see first that the predicted values based on the model hover around the value of one closely for both subsamples. For the group of industrial countries (IDC), the prediction average is statistically below the value of one in the late 1970s, the early 1980s, and the late 1980s. However, since the beginning of the 1990s, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the mean of the prediction values is one, indicating that the trilemma is -binding‖ for industrialized countries since then. For developing countries, the model is underpredicting from the end of the 1970s through the beginning of the 1990s. However, unlike the IDC group, the mean of the predictions has become statistically smaller than one since 2000. At 11 For this exercise, predictions also incorporate the interactions with the dummy variables shown in Table 2 .
12 Both the mean and the standard errors of the predicted values are calculated using the rolling five-year windows.
The formula for the mean and the standard errors can be shown as the very least, the mean of the predictions never gets above the value of one in statistical sense, implying that, despite some years when the trilemma is not binding, the three macroeconomic policies are linearly related with each other.
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The top panels also show that, among industrialized countries, the policy combination of increasing exchange rate stability and more financial openness became increasingly prevalent after the beginning of the 1990s whereas that of monetary independence and exchange rate stability has been consistently declining over the years. Among developing countries, the policy combination of exchange rate stability and financial openness has been the least prevalent over the sample period, most probably reflecting the bitter experiences of currency crises. The policy combinations of monetary independence and financial openness or that of monetary independence and exchange rate stability has been quite dominant, but that is mainly because of the dominant preference for monetary independence through the time period.
We also repeat the exercise using the regression models for each of the subsample period (excluding the break years corresponding to the end of the Bretton Woods system and the two crises). The results (not reported) are qualitatively the same as in Figure 4 .
Further Look into the "Middle-Ground" Convergence
Now that we have empirical evidence for the theoretical validity of the indexes, let us take a closer look at the distribution of the indexes. We pay particular attention to the tendency of the -middle-ground convergence‖ -a tendency that the indexes cluster around the intermediate levels for all three policy choices -especially among emerging market economies.
The Index of Policy Convergence
To see how much convergence is taking place, we calculate a new variable that measures the extent of divergence in all three trilemma indexes. The measure of triad policy divergence d it is calculated as follows:
where ̅̅̅ for X = MI, ERS, and KAOPEN, and ̅̅̅ is cross-country average of X in year t.
Here, we can consider d it as the measure of dispersion in all three policies in a particular year. The higher the d it is, the more dispersion among the three indexes in a particular year we can expect for country i, meaning that country i tends to have a combination of distinctively different triad policies. In terms of the triangle shown in Figure 1 , a country with a higher d it is considered to be closer to one of the corners or the sides of the triangle whereas a lower d it represents a policy combination closer to the middle of the triangle (see ). We can make several interesting observations based on this figure. For the last two decades, advanced economies tend to have combinations of distinctive policies. Not surprisingly, the Euro country group has the highest degree of policy divergence among the country groups, followed by the group of non-Euro advanced economies. As we have observed in Figure 2 To see what is driving the trajectories in Figure 5 , we look at the group mean of the ratios of each of the three indexes to its cross-country mean. We focus on developing economies and report the average ratios for emerging market economies and non-emerging market developing economies in Figures 6 and 7 , respectively. One interesting observation we can make is that both Asian emerging market economies and countries in the middle-east and northern Africa experienced high levels of policy divergence from the beginning of the 1980s through the early 1990s. This is mainly because the countries in both regional groups achieved higher levels of financial opening compared to the average of developing economies. 14 More interestingly, since the last few years of the 1990s, which coincides with the Asian Crisis period, the degrees of policy divergence have been persistently small among all regional groups. This policy convergence among developing economies may reflect the great moderation, but the convergence seems to be still in place in the last few years of the sample despite the global financial crisis. Lastly, despite its high levels of policy divergence in the 1980s, emerging market economies in Asia have been experiencing lowest levels of policy divergence. Aizenman, Chinn, and Ito (2011) What if we focus on the time period when developing economies, especially those with emerging markets, have been actively liberalizing financial markets? Figure 11 is a recreation of Figure 9 , but we now restrict the sample to the 1990-2009 period. We see a clear difference between emerging market economies and non-emerging market economies. Emerging market economies with lower levels of policy dispersion measure tend to experience lower levels of output volatility -the correlation coefficient is significant with a conventional significance level.
Non-emerging market economies, on the other hand, tend to experience higher levels of output volatility if they pursue lower levels of policy dispersion though the correlation coefficient is only marginally statistically. It appears that emerging market economies have dealt with financial globalization better than non-emerging market developing economies by having more converged policy combinations. 
The Trilemma to The Quadrilemma?
Open macroeconomic management is never an easy task especially for developing The most dramatic changes occurred in the China, increasing its reserve/GDP from below 5% in 1980, to about 50% in 2009. As has been widely discussed, a rapid increase in international reserves holding, especially in Asia, started in the post-Asian crisis period, suggesting that insurance motives are one of the motivations for developing economies to hold massive international reserves (Aizenman and Marion 2003) .
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Prior to the financial integration, the demand for reserves provided self-insurance against volatile trade flows. However, financial integration of developing countries also added the need to self-insure against volatile financial flows. By the nature of financial markets, the exposure to rapidly increasing demands for foreign currency triggered by financial volatility, exceeds by a wide margin the one triggered by trade volatility. The East Asian crisis was a watershed event, as it impacted high saving countries with overall balanced fiscal accounts. These countries were viewed as being less exposed to sudden stop events as compared with other developing countries prior to the crisis. With a lag, the affected countries reacted by massive increases in their stock of reserves.
Recent studies validate the importance of -financial factors‖ as key determinants, in addition to the traditional trade factors, in accounting for increased international reserves/GDP ratios. Indeed, recent research has revealed that the role of financial factors has increased in tandem with growing financial integration. More financially open, financially deep countries, with greater exchange rate stability tend to hold more reserves. Within the emerging market sample, the fixed exchange rate effect is weaker, but financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) is highly significant and growing in importance over time (Cheung and Ito 2009, Obstfeld et al. 2010 ). Trade openness is the other robust determinant of reserve demand, though its importance seems to have diminished over time (Cheung and Ito 2009) . The growing importance of financial factors helps in accounting for a greater share of the international reserves/GDP ratios (Aizenman and Lee 2007) . These results are in line with a broader self-insurance view, where reserves provide a buffer, both against deleveraging initiated by foreign parties, as well as against the sudden wish of domestic residents to acquire new external assets. That is, developing countries often face -sudden capital flight‖ (Calvo 1998 (Calvo , 2006 Aizenman and Lee 2007) in the form of -double drains‖ or -external and internal drains‖ (Obstfeld, et al. 2009 ).
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All these issues suggest that developing countries may need to manage their open macro policies on the basis of the -quadrilemma‖ rather than the trilemma.
The -diamond charts‖ in Figure 13 are useful to trace the changing patterns of the -quadrilemma‖ configurations. Each country's configuration at a given instant is summarized by a -generalized diamond,‖ whose four vertices measure monetary independence, exchange rate stability, IR/GDP ratio, and financial integration. The origin has been normalized so as to represent zero monetary independence, pure float, zero international reserves, and financial autarky. The panels of figures summarize the trends for industrialized economies, emerging
Asian economies, non-emerging market developing Asian economies, non-Asian developing economies, and Latin American emerging market economies.
In Figure 13 , we can observe again the divergence of the trilemma configurations for the industrial economies over the years-a move toward deeper financial integration, greater exchange rate stability, and weaker monetary independence-while reducing the level of IR holding over years. Asia, especially those economies with emerging markets, appears distinct from other groups of economies; the middle-ground convergence observed for the emerging market group is quite evident for this particular group of economies. This is not a recent phenomenon for the Asian emerging market economies, however. Since as early as the 1980s, the three indexes have been clustered around the middle range, though exchange rate stability has been the most pervasive policy choice and the degree of monetary independence has been gradually declining. This characterization is not applicable to the other groups of developing economies such as Latin American emerging market economies. Most importantly, the group of Asian emerging market economies stands out from the others with their sizeable and rapidly increasing amount of IR holding, making one suspect potential implications of such IR holdings on trilemma policy choices and macroeconomic performances. Aizenman, et al. (2010) empirically show that pursuing greater exchange stability can be increasing output volatility for developing economies, but that that can be mitigated by holding a greater amount of international reserves than the threshold of about 20% of GDP. find that emerging market economies seem to have adopted a policy combination of the three trilemma policies and international reserves that allow these economies to lessen output volatility through reduced real exchange volatility. Thus, it is not surprising for developing economies to have become active in accumulating international reserves in recent years.
Lastly, let us examine the impact of holding international reserves in the context of policy convergence. 
18
Having seen these results, we can conclude not only that the tendency for emerging market economies to have more converged policy combinations help them to experience lower levels of output volatility, but also that holding a higher level of international reserves may help them to get prepared for a future choice of policies that are more distinctively different from each other.
Concluding Remarks
We have with the opposite sign in the weighted average of the other two variables. In that sense, we have provided substantial content to the hypothesis of the -impossible trinity.‖
We also focused on the characteristics of the -middle-ground convergence‖ among emerging market economies. When we examined the correlation between the measure of policy divergence and the level of output volatility, we found that emerging market economies with more converged policy choices tend to experience smaller output volatility in the last two decades. In a world with rapidly proceeding financial globalization, financial liberalization can be a risky policy for developing economies, raising the importance of holding a large amount of international reserves as it has happened in the last decade. On that issue, we found some evidence that emerging markets with low levels of international reserves holding could experience higher levels of output volatility when they choose a policy combination with a greater degree of policy divergence while it does not apply to economies with high levels of international reserves holding. This may indicate that holding a high volume of international reserves may give room to emerging market economies to choose a policy combination from a wider spectrum of policy combinations.
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Appendix: Construction of the Trilemma Measures
Monetary Independence (MI)
The extent of monetary independence is measured as the reciprocal of the annual correlation between the monthly interest rates of the home country and the base country. Money market rates are used for the calculation.
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The index for the extent of monetary independence is defined as:
where i refers to home countries and j to the base country. By construction, the maximum value is 1, and the minimum value is 0. Higher values of the index mean more monetary policy independence. 19, 20 Here, the base country is defined as the country that a home country's monetary policy is most closely linked with as in Shambaugh (2004) . The base countries are Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. For the countries and years for which Shambaugh's data are available, the base countries from his work are used, and for the others, the base countries are assigned based on the International Monetary Fund's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and Central Intelligence Agency Factbook.
Exchange Rate Stability (ERS)
To measure exchange rate stability, annual standard deviations of the monthly exchange rate between the home country and the base country are calculated and included in the following formula to normalize the index between 0 and 1:
Merely applying this formula can easily create a downward bias in the index, that is, it would exaggerate the -flexibility‖ of the exchange rate especially when the rate usually follows a narrow band, but is de-or revalued infrequently. 21 To avoid such downward bias, we also apply a threshold to the exchange rate movement as has been done in the literature. That is, if the rate of monthly change in the exchange rate stayed within +/-0.33 percent bands, we consider the exchange rate is -fixed‖ and assign the value of one for the ERS index. Furthermore, single year pegs are dropped because they are quite possibly not intentional ones. 22 Higher values of this index indicate more stable movement of the exchange rate against the currency of the base country.
Financial Openness/Integration (KAOPEN)
Without question, it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account controls. 23 Although many measures exist to describe the extent and intensity of capital account controls, it is generally agreed that such measures fail to capture fully the complexity of real-world capital controls. Nonetheless, for the measure of financial openness, we use the index of capital account openness, or KAOPEN, by Ito (2006, 2008 
